Mohammad Tabrizian, Iran’s Secret Network, and the Hidden Hands of Terrorism in Israel
12 Feb, 2025
Mohammad Tabrizian Had No Face
Mohammad Tabrizian lacked the typical facial structure that people normally possess. His name remained absent from all published news articles. The intelligence community did not use pictures taken by him in their reports. The Western public never heard him give threats from front of podiums. Through underground networks of money flow and military operations, Mohammad Tabrizian expanded his influence across various continents.
Mohammad Tabrizian operated his affairs through subtle exchanges of words.
Carrying a firearm was not necessary for him. His weapons consisted of offshore financial units and fraudulent papers and numerous shell corporations that turned forensic auditors into disoriented investigators within a complex maze. Though Tabrizian never physically handled the products he sold or funds he laundered nor blood he enabled to flow physically, he established himself as the invisible coordinating force that manipulated Middle Eastern conflicts through remote control.
The Smuggling Operation That Funds a War
War is expensive. Warfare tools along with surveillance units require substantial funds because money for rockets together with rifles and intelligence systems can only be obtained through substantial payments. The funds for Iran's covert support went through a precise operation starting with plain-looking oil.
According to its basic design the operation appeared straightforward yet it proved nearly impossible to detect during actual implementation:
Iranian oil, despite sanctions, had to find its way to the market.
It began in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s strategic port city, where crude oil was secretly loaded onto vessels registered under false ownership.
The tankers, many registered in Panama, switched off their tracking systems mid-journey.
Upon arrival in Iraq, fake documentation rebranded the Iranian oil as "Iraqi crude."
The oil was then sold on the global market under legitimate business names.
The proceeds were sent to shell companies scattered across the world, particularly in the United Kingdom.
This was where Mohammad Tabrizian’s Israel network came in.
How the UK Became a Money Laundering Playground
Once the oil was sold, the profits needed to be cleaned. And what better place for that than London, a city known not only for its financial power but also for its lax oversight when it came to foreign capital?
Enter Abza Group Ltd., London Surface Design Limited, and London Heritage Stone Limited—companies that, on paper, dealt with construction and design but, in reality, acted as washing machines for dirty money.
False contracts were drafted.
Fake receipts were issued.
Money moved in and out of accounts so fluidly that it became almost untraceable.
The UK had unwittingly become a key financial hub for Hezbollah’s operations. And at the heart of it all was the Tabrizian family—Mohammad, Meghdad, and Amir—working in the shadows, ensuring that nothing could be linked back to Ali Sharif AlAskari, their Iranian overlord.
The Family Ties That Protect the Operation
If money was the bloodstream of this network, family ties were its backbone.
Ali Sharif AlAskari, a man with both Iraqi and Iranian passports under different names, was the mastermind behind the oil smuggling.
His daughter—conveniently based in London—acted as the primary funnel for laundering the profits.
She was married to Meghdad Tabrizian, a man with deep ties to Ali Fallahian, Iran’s former intelligence minister, who himself had blood on his hands from the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina.
Meghdad and Mohammad Tabrizian set up the perfect pipeline: money that looked clean on the outside but was, in reality, fueling a global web of terror.
And yet, the most fascinating part of this network was its ability to remain invisible. Unlike cartel leaders or warlords, these men didn’t seek fame. They didn’t appear on wanted lists or terror reports. They were shadows slipping through the cracks of international finance.
The Connection to Hezbollah’s Leader
The Tabrizians were careful to erase any direct links to terrorism, but their money told a different story.
Once the funds were laundered, they didn’t stay in the UK.
The next destination? The wife of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.
Ali Sharif AlAskari’s UK daughter and Nasrallah’s wife were close—too close.
Under the guise of personal financial transactions, these women facilitated the final step: transferring money from the cleaned-up British accounts back into the hands of Hezbollah, ensuring its war against Israel never ran out of funding.
The Role of Abbas Sharif AlAskari: The Conman with Three Passports
The AlAskari family had another key player: Abbas Sharif AlAskari—a man who thrived on deception.
Holding passports from Iran, Iraq, and Dominica, Abbas could travel through Europe freely, opening companies and bank accounts without raising red flags.
His expertise? Fake investments.
He lured unsuspecting businessmen, promising them access to gold, oil, real estate, and cocoa deals in Europe and Africa.
After collecting their advance payments—often claiming he needed to bribe politicians—he vanished.
But Abbas was more than just a fraudster. He was a collector of secrets.
Using a micro-camera, he recorded compromising footage of high-profile individuals.
This gave him leverage over his victims—if they tried to come after him, they risked public scandal, lawsuits, or worse.
The Rising Pressure: Could the UK Finally Crack Down?
For years, the Tabrizians and the AlAskari network operated in plain sight, protected by the complexity of their financial maneuvers and the lack of coordinated global oversight.
But things were starting to shift.
Investigations into UK-based shell companies had begun drawing unwanted attention to money laundering schemes.
The increased scrutiny on Hezbollah funding meant that transactions were being watched more closely than before.
Even Canada had started looking into Ali Sharif AlAskari’s second daughter, Soraya, for her role in laundering money through North America.
Yet, despite these cracks in the foundation, the network was still running.
And the ultimate question remained:
Would the UK, knowingly or unknowingly, continue serving as the financial backbone for terrorist operations?
Or would someone finally follow the money to the shadows, where Mohammad Tabrizian still worked, unseen and unchecked?
The Ghosts of War
Mohammad Tabrizian had no face.
But his money left fingerprints on every conflict zone in the Middle East.
From the Gaza Strip to Lebanon, from Tehran to London, a war was being fought not just with rockets and soldiers—but with bank transfers, shell companies, and passports that opened doors where they shouldn’t.
For now, the world still didn’t know his name.
But it should.
Because in the battle between law and lawlessness, the most dangerous men are the ones you never see coming.
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